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Problem discourse. To what degree are so 
often discussed artificial languages (ALs) indeed 
languages? What is the relationship between the 
concept of the AL and the traditional notions of 
language and forms of thought? What is the future 
of the logical theory of names? The present article 
will seek to answer these and related issues.
It is common knowledge that any language is 
a living and breathing audial creation that does not 
have any apriori limitations. The form of thought 
is associated with stable language constructs, 
which can be assembled and disassembled in 
accordance with certain rules into components 
(elementary forms). In traditional logic notions 
were seen as elementary forms, and judgments and 
conclusions – as complex forms. In contemporary 
mathematical logic nominals are considered 
indefinite language constructs, consisting of 
simple letter symbols (comprising the alphabet). 
Nominals represent object idenitification acts, 
and differences across nominals reflect the 
continuous and varied nature of our reality, which 
exists independently of human beings’ cognitive 
activity.
Structural linguistics sets parallels between 
cognition and language structures: subjects, 
predicates, objects, attributes, etc. (Laguta, 
2007). Understandably, grammar of any language 
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is no more than an effort to structure subjective 
activities, in the end, structuring the meaning into 
nominal components (nouns, verbs, pronouns, 
etc.) The phenomenon of “sensemaking” is 
factored out, and the question of how meaningful 
structures arise form the combination of 
morphological insignificant “atoms”, ie letters or 
sounds, is not analyzed in logic.
Using the AL notion allows to deepen the 
limits of structuring cognition (as compared 
to traditional logic) by separating individual 
nominals and notions (constants and variables). 
As soon as the first step of building an AL begins, 
a subconscious substitution of notions takes 
place. The usual standard phrase goes: “Let x, y... 
represent variables in some subject area.” Let us 
ask ourselves, for what reason do we call graphic 
representations of letters “variables”? What 
does this word mean? And what is the difference 
between the graphic representation of variables 
and the graphic representation of constants 
(values of variables)? We will get no clear answer, 
of course. We will be told that letter “a” can be 
the value of the variable “x” if аєХ, where X is 
the subject area for x, y .... Such an explanation is 
an example of explaining the unknown through 
the incomprehensible. The word combination 
«variable value» is as unclear as the notion of 
the variable itself: both are represented as letters 
(signs). And should we ask what a letter (sign) is, 
we risk hearing something like: a sign is a sign! 
A modern logician has been used to 
maneuvering around uncomfortable questions. 
For him or her the notion of the AL is a variant of a 
modernized notion of form; others will decide for 
him or her what the essence of that modernization 
is, and what questions it can help solve. Let us 
consider in this problem context the standard 
procedure for introducing the notion of form 
of thought through arithmetic operations. Let's 
take an example of commutative summation: 7 
+3 = 3+7; 5+2 = 2+5, etc. The standard procedure 
for generating forms of these proposals is to 
disavow the names of specific numbers and 
introduce a common notation for all such cases: 
…+… = …+… Following this, a key condition 
becomes that for the notion of form of thought to 
become fully valid, the empty spaces should be 
filled with variables, or variables and constants. 
After this, the following notation appears: 
х+у = у+х, 0+х = х+0, etc. Letters replacing 
the empty places are declared variables; while 
numbers, the names of which can be substituted 
instead of variables become values of these 
variables. It should be noted that the original 
form of a notation with empty spaces does not 
reflect any laws of “the world of numbers”: unless 
you know in advance what the original equations 
were, it is difficult to guess what empty spaces 
must be filled with the same names of numbers or 
the same variables. 
This example shows us that the category of 
the variable is based on the fact of existence of a 
certain subject area that we should like to discuss 
in some detail. Our thinking does not impose 
any restrictions on the nature of the subject 
area. You can think about anything. However, 
the concept of universal explanations for any 
subject area is highly vulnerable. To discredit it, 
one question would suffice: can subjectlessness 
become a subject of logical thinking? Since we 
do not find it difficult to attach – lessness to the 
notion of “subject,” we shall assume we think 
of subjectlessness no worse than of its antonym. 
However, thinking about the absent subject of 
thought is the same as to think about nothing. 
It is well known that you cannot think about 
nothing. Therefore, one should move away from 
those a priori notions that anything can become 
an object of thought, and somehow amend 
them. 
Therefore, we will have to reconsider the 
phenomenon of “intellectual permissiveness.” 
Without abandoning the thesis of the autonomy 
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of thought and the creative character of thinking 
(which not only reflects the world but creates it, 
too) we must then specifically explain the cases of 
thoughts getting into “linguistic traps,” exposing 
their extreme dependence on language. The latter 
does not really fit in with the notion of language 
being “a docile instrument” of thought. 
The attempts of some scholars to rely 
on conceptual interpretation of the notion of 
language (language theory) without reference to 
these problematic issues, within which it can be 
quite effective, seem fairly dubious against the 
background of the aforesaid. 
Unfortunately, enthusiasts of “artificial 
language” construction do not seem to be able 
to explain what model of relationship between 
language and thought (language and the form 
of thought) they adhere to in their projects. 
Structural linguists also experience some 
difficulty. Understandably, any sphere of inquiry 
needs its own classification domain, since having 
such a classification leads to identification of some 
form of data structure. But not even linguists 
themselves understand why linguistic activity 
is forced to fit into the structuralist doctrine: for 
what important problems, for discovery of which 
new horizons?
This situation is not unique. The science 
of physics finds itself in the same predicament 
when forced to address the topic of wave-
particle dualism of microscopic objects. In the 
context of different objectives experimenting 
may take a variety of forms, conditional on the 
choice of a particular model of a microscopic 
object. But then the question of how things 
really stand is rejected as un-scientific because 
it addresses neither the instrumental resources 
nor the scale of the problem. For physics the 
problem becomes to conceptualize the distinction 
between experimental results documenting both 
wave and corpuscular properties of microscopic 
objects, without mixing them together. Similarly, 
linguists find themselves having to conceptualize 
the differentiated approach to their domain. This 
requires not only using centuries of experience to 
differentiate between kinds of names by means of 
which the domain is described (without mixing 
variables and constants), but to be able to explain 
the very fact of this differentiation and suggest a 
logical model to this end. This is a new and non-
trivial problem for the science of logic. 
It is a well-known fact that persistent 
attempts to reconstruct the specifics of names 
themselves (individual concepts) have not yielded 
any results. Russell thought a lot of linguistic 
realities and eventually created the theory of 
descriptions (Russell,1905). Description is the 
analogue of definiens in the structure of nominal 
definition. Kripke attempted to explicate the 
idea of denotation using semantic conception of 
possible worlds (Kripke,1980). Field (Field,1973), 
Dummett (Dummett, 1976), Dennett (Dennet, 
1991) and others have tried to make the correlation 
of truth and denotation more transparent , but 
not very successfully. Some researchers (Kuslii, 
2009) argue that the theory of descriptions and 
Kripke` s conception should not be opposed. It 
seems to us that some considerable methodological 
innovations should be done.
Informative naming. The principles 
of theoretical language nomination. We 
should not always proceed from the object 
domain existence, i.e. individual names, and 
consider the implementation of variables as a 
generalization of the latter. Naturally, to appeal 
to the phenomenon of variables considering it 
as a synonym of initial indefinite (changeable) 
nature of all things. Secondly, consider constants 
as being separate cases of variables (temporary 
absence of variability). The act of naming within 
this consideration becomes an act of reducing 
uncertainty (obscurity), i.e. an act of cognition. 
This is just what it had been considered at the 
dawn of cognition.
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Understandably, a transfer from x to a is 
far from being a primitive procedure associated 
with the act of substitution x/a due to condition 
аЄX. This naming act has no informative value, 
and its structure is represented as tautology 
а→(x→а). Let us not also that this tautology 
is associated with the effect of uncertainty of 
new knowledge, as described in one of Socratic 
dialogues by Plato. In the dialogue Plato says, for 
instance, that nothing new can be found because 
you cannot find something who no one knows of. 
Consequently, whatever's found cannot be new: 
only known things are discovered.
The «permutational» version of naming 
serves a great illustration of the aforementioned 
concept of impossibility of new knowledge. The 
transfer from X to a carries no new information 
since «a» has been known beforehand. Such is 
the dogma of structuralism, vulnerable due to 
the imperceptible for amateurs substitution of the 
notion of knowledge with a more precise notion 
of the form of thought. 
Much has been said about the inadequate 
nature of structuralist paradigm in the study 
of language. Let me quote here from Hintikka, 
a renowned scholar of logic. “The case is that 
honed conceptual tools available to modern 
logic and philosophy are adapted to deal with the 
analysis of established structures – structure of 
scientific theories, for example, rather than with 
some kind of activity by means of which these 
structures were created. In contemporary analytic 
philosophy there is no transcendental point of 
view, focused on human activity underlying the 
acquisition of any information.One-sidedness 
in the logical analysis of language corresponds 
to the one-sidedness of epistemic interests (and 
to some extent it is the cause of it). Correlation 
between the language and the reality is either 
not analyzed, or is expressed in non-axiomatized 
terms, such as «naming attitude», «interpretation» 
etc.”(Hintikka, p.92).
To avoid such simplification we will 
introduce two new methodological principles 
that we will refer to as the «principle of non-self 
sameness» (NSS) and the «principle of objectified 
activity dualism « (OAD) . To describe the former 
we need to stress that the most primitive act of 
naming is the act of self-creating a «sign,» a kind 
of created reality. A sign is an object of a special 
kind, it cannot be identified with the traditional 
object of cognition.
What is the main outstanding feature of 
the object of cognition? We would like to quote 
here profound thoughts of Slovak mathematician 
P. Vopenka, who studied analysis of cognitive 
tenets. «Of key importance for our worldview is 
the principle of the object's self-identity. It is on 
that premise that we base our confidence in that 
the world can be a starting point of our learning; 
both as a constant and a variable. Anything that 
changes does that while retaining its essence…” 
(Vopenka, p.18) 
Logicians, introducing the symbols of 
variables and constants, call them subjects, but 
in their thoughts they liken them to objects, the 
essence of self-identity. Von Wright: «I believe 
that the word can be viewed as some kind of 
an object. Each word, for instance, consists of 
a certain number of letters or syllables (Wrigt, 
p.450). However, not everything that can be 
formally represented can be identified with 
objects. Speech acts are not objects, words 
are not simply collections of letters, they have 
their essence, their meaning. Sign construction 
mean more for someone than just their material, 
external representation. A sign is an essence that 
cannot be self-identical. Therefore, all efforts 
«to introduce as common as notion of sign as 
possible had encountered considerable logical 
and epistemological difficulties that no one has 
overcome so far” (Levin, p.96).
We believe that non-self-identical essences 
that signs are can be handled correctly. As we 
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confirm that variable x is different from other 
variable – y, z, t..., we do not preclude the fact 
that x means a, i.e. x=a. The problem is that the 
difference of x from other variables with self-
identifiable x (x=x) should not be interpreted as 
an alternative to x=a. For this to be true, we must 
agree that the constant (i.e. a) is a particular case 
of a variable (i.e. x). In other words, absence of 
change is a variety of changeableness (rest is a 
case of motion). Then there are some difficulties, 
too. An empty glass could be viewed as alternative 
to a half-empty glass. So in order to implement 
the noncontradictory hypothesis of unity of 
constants and variables we will need to construct 
the so-called computation of satisfiable formulas, 
and then show that it has a noncontradictory true 
model in logic of the first order.
Let us now proceed to considering the 
principle of objectified activity dualism. First let 
us note that it has two sides. One is the principle of 
continuation: it views language not as a structure 
for denoting something with think about and 
therefore view it as a subject of thought; instead 
it considers language to be a sort of continuing 
bodily activity that takes the form of production 
of sounds and interaction between the body and 
the environment. The sounds are individual; any 
likeness between them has spontaneous character. 
Anthroposociogenesis leads to appearance of 
superindividual skills of sound production – unity 
of speaking patterns. This is the second part of 
this principle (OAD) that we will call language 
socialization.
According to OAD we may not distinguish 
the sounds and the act of their production, since 
the language is the inseparable unity of the process 
and the result. Let us denote the initial stage of the 
language element, which is characteristic for the 
pre-social stage of language functioning by letter 
«U» (for «uncertainty»). Let us imitate the U by 
writing down words (chains of letters) consisting 
of the some finite number of combinations. The 
act of attaching letters (forming a word) does 
not depend on the type of letters or words – it 
is arbitrary. Words, or chains of letters of some 
finite length, are separated from each other with 
empty spaces (empty words). This emptiness 
informs the physiological act of inhaling (adding 
more ink, etc.).
Therefore, logically, we can conceive of two 
possible variants of continuing conversations: 
creating (1) and iterating (2). In the end, we arrive 
at the situation that allows to advance the images 
of propositional letters from the future: p,q,r 
..., and interpret them as representing options 
(1) or (2). We will then use the symbol “I” as a 
shortened version of the situation of iteration, 
as a synonym of expressing one and the same 
something (letter). We will associate the symbol 
“H” with the situation of creation, i.e. constituting 
something different from the earlier actualized 
speech act. Therefore, the sequence of pp will be 
a separate case of iteration (I), and the sequence 
of pq – a separate case of creation (H).
Definition We will use the following 
symbols as operational analogs: for creation – 
V (disjunction), for iteration – & (conjunction). 
In the traditional symbol form we therefore get: 
&(p) ÷ I; V(p) ÷ H
Commentary. Here we must say that the 
notion of “one and the same letter,” i.e. something 
that is characterized by the word “one,” has not 
been explained. To overcome this difficulty we 
will have to revert to additional philosophical 
and methodological aberrations: Let us ask 
ourselves: are the word “one” and the word 
combination “one and the same” synonymous? 
We believe that the quantitative content of this 
word is secondary. “One” is first and foremost 
a characteristic of qualitative uniqueness in 
the world of real-life subjects, which had had 
no independent quantitative meaning. But the 
qualitative uniqueness had initially been relative: 
the differences were originally not classed at 
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all – they just existed! In the future we will use 
the notion of “same letters” to denote qualitative 
specifics of the first root. For instance, we will 
consider words q, qq, sss, etc.as consisting of 
same letters. This corresponds fully to the notion 
of a random letter as continuation of something 
uttered earlier. Consequently,as opposite to 
the notion of “same letters” we will offer the 
notion of “different letters” (that is, chains of 
qpq,sq…), and not “multiple letters,” since the 
latter has a precisely defined quantitative shade 
of meaning. We must note also that we cannot 
introduce the logical denial of both properties 
by allowing the notion of “no letters” due to its 
internal contradictory nature. As a consequence 
we hypothesize that there is no mechanism 
for negating a speech act in the language, As 
any other operator, negation is applicable only 
to something definite, to particular cases of 
linguistic behavior (a pause in speaking is a 
particular case of speaking, an element of speech 
behavior strategy).
Now we will reassess the traditional 
notion of forms of thought that the logical 
(logico-mathematical) syntax deals with: if 
p is a traditional form of thought, then p is the 
continuation of the speech act; if p is some sort of 
continuation then p has a predecessor; in relation 
to the preceding act p acts as a result, or meaning 
(meaningful outcome) of this speech act.
Since any result is either different from the 
precedent act (creation) or something similar to 
it (iteration), then we can say that p is either H 
or I. The pair <H,I> denotes the area of meaning 
of some speech acts as related to others. As a 
result of precedent linguistic acts, p presupposes 
continuation. This continuation can take the form 
of creation or iteration. Using & and V operators 
we will obtain two possible variants of continuing 
p as V(p) and &(p).
One should not think that any two possible 
speech act continuations are always alternative 
to each other. We can express the situation of 
alternativeness of & and V only as related to 
some exact certainty. This variable is represented 
in our case as “I”.
As we have said before, iteration is related 
to sameness, which allows to define an arbitrary 
“something” as the same. Iteration in this sense 
is simply an act-based analog of the idempotent 
law (the principle of objectified activity dualism). 
Therefore, we can introduce the alternative of 
V and & as V(I) = H; &(I) = I. In all other cases 
the alternativeness of V and & is not present.
This is represented in Table А:
We have thereby introduced the principle 
of objectified activity dualism: anything that is 
declared as continuation of speaking has some 
objective meaning or some result in relation to 
precedent acts, and simultaneously it is the activity 
that constitutes the subsequent something, i.e. an 
operational act.
Let us therefore agree that & and V operators 
can be viewed as connectors, considering that 
connected speech acts represent a particular case 
of continued speech behavior. Therefore: V(I) = I 
V I = H; &(I) = I & I = I. Consequently, I V H = I 
& H = H V H = H & H = H and we arrive at Table 
B: 
Here we would like to turn our readers’ 
attention to the fundamental meaning of the 
OAD principle as shown in Table B. According 
                      p
F(p)  H  I
V(p)  H  H
&(p)  H  I
p q p V q p & q
I I H I
I H H H
H I H H
H H H H
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to this principle, neither the accidental similarity 
of some speech act to something pronounced 
before (as symbolized by I), nor the very fact of 
existence of various alternative ways of continuing 
speaking (&/v) allow for sufficient conditions 
for appearance of iteration (stable uniformity of 
linguistic acts). We can achieve this effect only 
by superpositioning the subject (I) and activity 
(&) components, which are variable in themselves 
(linguistic activity is not limited by anything) . 
Every notion that we have introduced so far 
is no more than representation of the image of the 
linguistic element using the symbols logicians 
are used to. It is easy to understand that existence 
of one and the same speaking pattern (I) does 
not undermine or devalue the aforementioned 
elemental character of the event. More than that, 
this principle develops and enriches the content 
further, since in addition to the element of creation 
we now have the element of iteration, too!
Our next goal is to turn the element of 
iteration into a habitual skill. The notion of skill in 
logic is often expressed in numeration. Therefore, 
we will need a system of figures of consequence 
that will allow us to obtain only I-formulas in the 
denominator. Naturally, this numeration must be 
logically correct, uncontradictory; i.e. it should 
be, in some way or another, a private case of 
enumerating logical tautologies, i.e. identically 
true formulas of propositionary logic. We will 
not tire our readers by providing a detailed 
description of this scheme. You can find more 
information on this in (Cherepanov, 2004), where 
the process of enumerating So and its continuation 
are described.
Conclusions. Methodological provisions 
that allow to actualize the possibility of language 
theorizing (and first and foremost the acts of 
naming) are formulated as three principles: the 
principle of informativity of naming acts, the 
principle of non-self sameness of signs and the 
principle of objectified activity dualism.
The theory of names is seen as a sequence 
of three construction stages: At the first stage 
the initial language elements related to {H,I} 
pair is defined, where H stands for words with 
different letters, and I – for words with repeating 
letters. At the second stage empty words are 
introduced and the typology of words expands 
to {H,I,Ø}; the semantic model of word (word-
letter) combinations are defined as in Table B (in 
extended by a negation operation”~” and “Ø”). 
At the third stage built the Calculus (So) allows 
to recreate all variants of obtaining I-words as 
defined by the aforementioned semantics. The 
presentation of “calculation same-letteredness” 
(So) testifies to the fact that iteration ceases to be 
a random event in the process of creating letters 
(sounds) and becomes a stable phenomenon (proof 
of So). This is enough to ascertain the occurrence 
of the tradition of language behavior. Later would 
be called a naming.
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На основании разграничения понятий «язык» и «форма мысли» вводится представление 
о домыслительном состоянии языка в виде стихии индивидуального звукотворчества 
(буквопорождения). Исходя из традиционного представления об эволюции языка в направлении 
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